

Message Text

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INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY
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CINCPAC HONOLULU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 NEW DELHI 4044

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR,PINT, IN, US, PK, BD, NP, XF, PRC
SUBJECT: PAST VIEWS OF JANATA LEADERS ON INDIA'S NEIGHBORS,
THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE USA

REF: NEW DELHI 3944

SUMMARY: THE JANATA PARTY AND THE CFD IN THEIR MANIFESTOS ENDORSE
GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING STATES. ONLY PAKISTAN AND NEPAL,
HOWEVER, FIGURED EVEN MINIMALLY IN THEIR CAMPAIGNING, MOST NOTABLY
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IN THE JANATA PARTY CALLING FOR THE RELEASE OF FORMER NEPALI PM
B.P. KOIRALA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS IN NEPAL. THE
PAST RECORD OF THEIR VIEWS ON PAKISTAN, HOWEVER, IS ABUNDANT.
SINCE DISTRUST FOR PAKISTAN HAS ALWAYS BEEN HIGH
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF EMBARRASSING THE CONGRESS GOVT A CONSTANT
TEMPTATION, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT A NUMBER OF JANATA LEADERS
HAVE COMPILED A STRONG ANTI-PAKISTAN RECORD, ALTHOUGH MOST OF

THEM HAVE AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR RECONCILIATION. EXCEPT FOR THE 1971 WAR AND THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR INDIA OF SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN'S SHIFT TO A PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM IN 1975, BANGLADESH HAS NOT OCCUPIED THE ATTENTION OF JANATA LEADERS. ON CHINA, JANATA LEADERS IN THE PAST HAVE SPOKEN OF THE NEED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, BUT SEVERAL HAVE SAID THAT INDIA SHOULD NOT DO SO AS LONG AS CHINA OCCUPIES INDIAN TERRITORY. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, MORAJI DESAI AND JANA SANGH LEADERS HAVE INDICATED A DESIRE FOR A MORE BALANCED POSITION ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. WHILE MANY OF THE JANATA LEADERS ARE ANTI-COMMUNIST AND SOME HAVE EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE UNITED STATES, THEY HAVE NOT HESITATED TO CRITICIZE THE USG ON CERTAIN ISSUES, MOST NOTABLY DURING THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR IN 1971 AND OVER THE ISSUE OF ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN. END SUMMARY.

1. THE MANIFESTO OF THE JANATA PARTY CALLS FOR A QUOTE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY UNQUOTE AND THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES, BUT DOES NOT CITE SPECIFIC COUNTRIES. THE CFD IN ITS MANIFESTO EXPLICITLY CALLS FOR QUOTE BUILDING BRIDGES OF FRIENDSHIP WITH OUR CLOSER NEIGHBORS, PARTICULARLY OUR BROTHERS IN PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH, UNQUOTE BUT SAYS NOTHING FURTHER. IN A MARCH 19 STATEMENT TO THE PRESS, THE JANATA PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY SURENDRA MOHAN (A SOCIALIST) COMMENTED ON PAKISTAN AND NEPAL AS VLIANTLY RESISTING TYRANNY AND AUTHORITARIANISM. MOHAN SAID THE ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN WERE RIGGED. HE DEPLORED THE ABSENCE OF POLITICAL FREEDOMS IN NEPAL FOR THE PAST 17 YEARS AND THE ARREST OF FORMER NEPALI PM, B.P. KOIRALA. THE SOCIALISTS HAVE FOR MANY YEARS SUPPORTED THE NEPALI CONGRESS, BUT WE CANNOT SAY AT THIS TIME THEEXTENT TO WHICH THEIR VIEWS WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE NEW CONFIDENTIAL

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GOVT'S POLICY TOARD NEPAL. IT IS, HOWEVER, SIGNFICANT THAT A STATEMENT WAS ISSUED ON MARCH 5 IN THE NAME OF THE JANATA PARTY CALLING FOR THE RELEASE OF KOIRALA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS IN NEPAL.

2. PAKISTAN. OF ALL THE NEIGHBORS, PAKISTAN HAS MOST OCCUPIED THE ATTENTION OF INDIAN POLITICIANS AND IT IS ON THIS RELATIONSHIP THAT THE RECORD OF JANATA LEADERS IS THE MOST COMPLETE. SINCE INDIAN DISTRUST FOR PAKISTAN HAS ALWAYS BEEN HIGH, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF EMBARRASSING A CONGRESS GOVT WITH CHARGES OF BEING SOFT ON PAKISTAN HAS BEEN A CONSTANT TEMPTATION, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT A NUMBER OF THE JANATA LEADERS HAVE COMPILED A STRONG ANTI-PAKISTAN RECORD. THIS IS NOTABLY TRUE AMONG THE FORMER JANA SANGH CAPTAINS SUCH AS ATAL BEHARI VAJPAYEE AND L.K. ADVANI. IN THEIR CASE THISPOSITION NO DOUBT REFLECTS A BACKGROUND OF JANA SANGH NATINALISM IN HINDU MAHASABA AND RSS, AND THE HATREDS BORN OF THE PARTITION PERIOD, BUT IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT ALL PARTIES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF JANA SANGH SUPPORTED THE 1972 SIMLA AGREEMENT.

3. ADVANI SAID IN 1974: "APPEASEMENT OF PAKISTAN HAS NEVER PAID AND NEVER WILL PAY". HE WAS OPPOSED TO THE SIMLA AGREEMENT, THE EXCHANGE OF POW'S IN 1973 AND DISTRUSTFUL OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE INDIAN POSITION IN KASHMIR. VAJPAYEE CHARGED IN 1972 THAT THE SIMLA AGREEMENT WAS THE RESULT OF FOREIGN PRESSURE. HE THREATENED PHYSICAL RESISTANCE TO THE RETURN OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY TO PAKISTAN, AND ASSERTED PEACE COULD NOT BE PURCHASED BY HANDING OVER TERRITORY. VAJPAYEE AT THE TIME CALLED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO DECLARE THAT THE ONE-THIRD OF KASHMIR UNDER PAKISTANI OCCUPATION WOULD NEVER BE HANDED OVER TO PAKISTAN. HE SAID THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF SETTLING THE KASHMIR ISSUE ON THE BASIS OF CONVERTING THE CEASE-FIRE LINE WITH MINOR ADJUSTMENTS INTO AN INTERNATIONAL BORDER. ON THE OTHER HAND, VAJPAYEE SAID AT THE SAME TIME HE LAUNCHED HIS DIATRIBE AGAINST SIMLA THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN PERPETUAL CONFRONTATION WITH PAKISTAN.

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XBK NCRSAMONN "...IT IS INEVITABLE THAT INDIA AND PAKISTAN LIVE AS FRIENDS IN THE HINDUSTANPENINSULA. OUR HISTORY, OUR GEOGRAPHY AND OUR CULTURE HAVE DESTINED IT SO... TO ACHIEVE THIS END WE HAVE TO DEFEAT THE IDEOLOGY THAT LED TO THE PARTITION OF INDIA. ONLY THAT WILL ENSURE DURABLE PEACE". (CONTINUED)

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4. FORMER CONGRESS (O) LEADER MORARJI DESAI, ALTHOUGH ALSO A
HARDLINER ON PAKISTAN, HAS TAKEN A SOMEWHAT MORE BALANCED POSITION
ON INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS THAN HAS THE JANA SANGH. EARLY IN
1971 HE CALLED FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN.
LATER THAT YEAR HIS VOICE BECAME MORE STRIDENT, AND HE WARNED THAT
A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH A DEMOCRATIC GOVT IN BANGLADESH
MIGHT BE LOST. HE CONTENDED THAT COULD ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED
WITH DRASTIC ACTION AGAINST PAKISTAN BY INDIA OR THE UN. MORARJI
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HAS BEEN QUIET ON THE ISSUE SINCE 1971, HIS PREOCCUPATIONS MORE
INTERNAL THAN EXTERNAL.
IN HIS INTERVIEWS THIS WEEK WITH BOTH
THE "NEW YORK TIMES" AND "TIME" MAGAZINE, HE APPARENTLY MADE
NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO PAKISTAN.

5. DURING HIS STINT AS DEFENCE MINISTER, JAGJIVAN RAM MADE
A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS ON PAKISTAN, FOR THE MOST PART RESPONSIBLE,
BUT SOME OF COURSE REFLECTING THE TEMPER OF THE 1971
HOSTILITIES. HE DID NOT TAKE A PARTICULARLY BELICOSE POSITION IN
THE IMMEDIATE PRE-HOSTILITY PERIOD. HIS STATEMENTS AS THE WAR
PROGRESSED IN INDIA'S FAVOR WERE CALM AND DEVOID OF RANCOR,
OR GLOATING, BUT HE WAS CLEARLY PROUD OF INDIA'S VICTORY AND TOLD
TROOPS IN JANUARY 1971 PAKISTAN WOULD NOT DARE CONSIDER AGGRESSION
ON INDIA FOR A THOUSAND YEARS. BY APRIL 1972 RAM WAS ASSERTING THAT
PAKISTAN SHOULD COME TO TERMS WITH INDIA SO THE TWO COUNTRIES
COULD LIVE PEACEFULLY AS FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS. "NONE OF US CAN
AFFORD WAR", HE SAID. AT ONE POINT RAM ARGUED FOR THE ABOLITION
OF THE UN MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN KASHMIR, BUT ADDED THAT THE
GOI WOULD TAKE NO INITIATIVE TO ASK THE GROUP TO LEAVE. IN
JUNE OF THAT YEAR HE ADVOCATED AN INDO-PAK-BANGLADESH PEACE AXIS
WHEN URGING THE ALL-INDIA BANGLADESH YOUTH ASSOCIATION TO INSPIRE
THE YOUTH OF PAKISTAN WITH THE IDEALS OF NATIONALISM, SOCIALISM,
SECULARISM, AND DEMOCRACY. RAM SAW THE THREE PEOPLES
AS COMMON HEIRS OF HISTORY, TRADITIONS, CULTURE, AND PROBLEMS OF

THE COMMON MAN. IN LATE 1972 HE SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THE PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN WERE TIRED OF STERILE CONFRONTATION, BUT WARNED THAT SOME OF THEIR LEADERS WERE STILL TO ADJUST THEIR PREJUDICES TO THE NEEDS OF THE TIME. IN MID-1973 HE FOUND AN IDENTITY OF VIEWS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE ACQUISITION OF ARMS BY PAKISTAN, AND IRAN.

6. THE JANATA'S STRONGEST VOICE FOR CONCILIATION WITH PAKISTAN IS UNDERSTANDABLY THAT OF ITS MORALIST, J.P. NARAYAN, WHO HAS LONG BEEN ACTIVE AS A PEACEMAKER, HE WAS A FOUNDER OF THE PAKISTAN CONCILIATION COMMISSION IN 1964. NARAYAN WAS OUTSPOKEN, HOWEVER, IN HIS OPPOSITION TO THE LIFTING OF THE US ARMS EMBARGO IN 1975, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND CALLED IT A MOVE TO REARM PAKISTAN IN A FRAMEWORK OF IMPERIALISM. NARAYAN ALSO SAID IT WAS "A STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF DESTABILIZING THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION IN THE SUB-CONTINENT". FORMER CONGRESS (O) LEADER ASHOKA MEHTA LIKEWISE HAS A RECORD OF CONCILIATION. HE CALLED FOR ACCORD WITH PAKISTAN AND CHINA AS EARLY AS 1970. HE IS NOT, HOWEVER, INDIFFERENT TO INDIAN INTERESTS, AND WARNED THE PARLIAMENT IN THE SAME YEAR THAT PAKISTAN WAS MORE SUCCESSFUL IN ITS DIPLOMACY WITH THE ARABS THAN WAS INDIA. IN REGARD TO THE FUTURE OF INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS, THE PAKISTANI MINISTER TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER MARCH 22 THAT HE CONSIDERED THE ABSENCE OF PAKISTAN AS AN ISSUE IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN A GOOD OMEN FOR THE FUTURE OF RELATIONS.

7. BANGLADESH. THE ONLY PERSON TO RAISE BANGLADESH IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN WAS MRS. GANDHI WHO DID SO IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 1971 WAR AND THE FATE OF SHEIKH MUJIB IN 1975. JANATA LEADERS SAID LITTLE, ALTHOUGH MORARJI DESAI IN ONE INTERVIEW REFERRED TO BANGLADESH AS ONE EXAMPLE OF WHAT HAPPENS IN DICTATORSHIPS. IN 1971, OPPOSITION LEADERS WERE ALL IN SYMPATHY WITH THE BANGLADESHIS, WITH MORARJI DESAI AND THE JANA SANGH FAULTING THE GOI FOR ITS SLOWNESS IN RECOGNIZING THE QUOTE BANGLA DESH UNQUOTE GOVT AND VAJPAYEE CALLING FOR AN ULTIMATUM TO PAKISTAN AND DESCRIBING AS FUTILE THE GOI'S SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. BANGLADESH AGAIN BECAME A POLITICAL ISSUE IN JANUARY 1975 WHEN SHEIKH MUJIB SWITCHED TO A PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM. J.P. NARAYAN, JANA SANGH LEADERS, AND BLD LEADERS CONDEMNED THE SHIFT AS AN END TO DEMOCRACY IN BANGLADESH AND SAW IT AS A DISQUIETING PRECEDENT FOR INDIA. SINCE THEN THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE IN THE WAY OF PUBLIC COMMENT ON EVENTS IN BANGLADESH OR INDO-BANGLADESHI RELATIONS. WITH THE EMERGENCY AND PRESS CENSORSHIP IN EFFECT IN INDIA, THE COUPS IN BANGLADESH IN 1975 AND INCREASING TENSIONS IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, SUCH AS BORDER RAIDS AND FARAKKA, EVOKED NO PUBLISHED COMMENT FROM THE PRESENT LEADERS OF THE JANATA PARTY. JAGJIVAN RAM, AS CHIEF GOI NEGOTIATOR ON FARAKKA, IS PROBABLY THE ONE POTENTIAL LEADER OF THE NEW GOVT WITH ANY REAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES STRAINING RELATIONS WITH BANGLADESH. BANGLADESH CONFIDENTIAL

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HICOMM OFDYICIALS IN NEW DELHI SEE RAM AS A CONCILIATORY FORCE IN INDO-BDG RELATIONS AND HOPE THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE NEW GOVT TO MEET WITH BDG EARLY IN APRIL FOR NEW TALKS ONFARAKKA WATER DISPUTE.

8. CHINA. JANATA PARTY LEADERS HAVE SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE PRC IN THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN AND LITTLE OF NOTE IN THIS DECADE. CHINA CAME IN FOR CRITICISM FOR THE CONGRESS (O) AND JANA SINGH FOR ITS SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN IN THE 1971 WAR AND ITS SUBSEQUENT BLOCKING OF BANGLADESH MEMBESHIP IN THE UN. MORARJII DESAI IN 1971, HOWEVER, HELD THE US MORE TO BLAME THAN THE PRC FOR PAKISTANI BELLICOSITY. MORE RECENTLY THERE HAVE BEEN PREDICTABLE EX-PRESSIONS OF DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS BUT WITH THE RESER-VATION THAT CHINA MUST GIVE UP THE QUOTE INDIAN TERRITORY UNQUOTE IN AKSAI CHIN. IN QOUE, MORARJI DESAI WROTE THAT IT WAS WRONG FOR THE GOI TO PUBLICLY OFFER NORMALIZATION QUOTE WHEN THE CHINESE HAVE NOT VACATED THEIR AGGRESSION ON OUR SOIL. UNQUOTE AND THE JANA SANGH IN 1973 SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT WANT TO SEEK THE FRIEND-SHIP OF CHINA UNTIL INDIA RECOVERED THE AKSA CHIN. IN 1974, L.K. ADVANI SAID THAT INDIA SHOULD NOT BUY FRIENDSHIP WITH CHINA BY COMPROMISING ON NATIONAL INTEREST AT THE COST OF AKSAI CHIN. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DID NOT WANT INDIA'S STANCE OF CHINA TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS BEING DICTATED BY RUSSIA.
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9. MIDDLE EAST. APPEALING TO MUSLIMVOTERS, SOME CONGRESS LEADERS DURING THE CAMPAIGN SAID THAT THE JANATA PARTY WOULD INSTITUTE A PRO-ISRAEL POLICY. ALTHOUGH THE PARTY MANIFESTO MAKES NO REFERENCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST, PARTY LEADER MORARJI DESAI TOLD THE NEW YORK TIMES (REPORTED HERE MARCH 22) THAT HE WOULD RALIGN INDIAN POLICY TOWARD EVEN-HANDEDNESS IN SUCH CONFLICTS AS THOSE BETWEENISRAEL AND THE ARABS AND BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS. MOREOVER, THE JANA SANGH IN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS IN 1973 AND 1974
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RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOI ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND SEEK TO CONVINCE THE ARABS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT TAKE INDIAN SUPPORT FOR GRANTED. THE JANA SANGH COMPLAINED THAT THE ARABS WERE NOT RECIPROCATING INDIAN SUPPORT. ON THE OIL PRICE RISE, THE JANA SANGH WANTED THE GOI TO TAKE THE LEAD IN VARIOUS INTERNATINAL FORA TO DISSUADE THE OPEC NATIONS FROM USING OIL AS A QUOTE WEAPON OF POLITICAL BLACKMAIL UNQUOTE AND TO MOBILIZE OPINION IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN FAVOR OF A TWO - TIER RICE SYSTEM. ASOKA MEHTA, THEN CONGRESS (O) LEADER, ALSO CALLED IN 1970 FOR THE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL. CFD LEADERS ARE NOT ON RECORD SPECIFICALLY REGARDING THEIR VIEWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE MORE LEFT-LEANING CFD WOULD ENDORSE A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN GOI POLICY. EGYPTIAN MINISTER TOLD EMBOFF TODAY HE THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT NEW GOI WOULD TAKE MORE EVEN-HANDED POLICY TOWARD ARABS AND ISRAEL BUT OFFERED NO COMMENT ON EGYPTIAN REACTION TO SUCH A MOVE.

10. THE UNITED STATES. AS WE NOTED IN REFTTEL, MANY OF THE JANATA LEADERS ARE ANTI-COMMUNIST AND SOME HAVE EXPRESSED ADMIRATION OF THE UNITED STATES. THEY HAVE CONSIDERED THAT THE CONGRESS GOVT HAD TILTED AWAY FROM NON-LAIGNMENT TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND HAD UNNECESSARILY ALIENATED THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. THIS IS NOT TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT JANATA LEADERS HAVE BEEN UNCRITICAL OF THE UNITED STATES. THEY WERE UNRESERVEDLY

CRITICAL IN 1971 DURING THE INDO-PAK WAR AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH. MORARJI DESAI, FOR INSTANCE, BLAMED PRESIDENT NIXON AND CHOU-EN-LAI FOR THE DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN BY HAVING ENCOURAGED YAHYA KHAN TO FOLLOW A QUOTE POLICY OF GENOCIDE UNQUOTE IN EAST PAKISTAN. THE JANA SANGH WAS ALSO CRITICAL AT THE TIME, AND CONTINUED ITS CRITICISM AT THE TIME OF THE SIMLA AGREEMENT. VAJPAYEE THEN INSISTED THAT THE GOI HAD SIGNED THE SIMLA AGREEMENT UNDER PRESSURE DIRECTLY FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIRECTLY FROM THE UNITED STATES; THE GOI, HE SAID WANTED US FINANCING FOR THE FIFTH ECONOMIC PLAN. THE JANA SANGH INITIATES NATIONALISTIC STANCE HAS BEEN OPPOSED TO FOREIGN AID. IN THIS CONTEXT, L.K. ADVANI SAID IN 1974 THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR INDIA TO REVIVE
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PL-480 AID FROM THE USA QUOTE FOR AID HAS NEVER BEEN BENEFICIAL FOR US UNQUOTE. THE QUESTION OF US ARMS SUPPLY TOWARD PAKISTAN HAS ALSO AUTOMATICALLY EVOKED RESPONSES FROM THE OPPOSITION. IN 1975, THE JANA SANGH RELEASED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE QUOTE US DECISION TO REARM PAKISTAN UNQUOTE. THE JANA SANGH CLAIMED THAT THE US MOTIVE WAS SUPPOSEDLY TO RESTORE THE BALANCE UPSET BY INDIA'S NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. THE JANA SANGH SAID THAT QUOTE IT IS NO PART OF THE US BUSINESS TO THROW ITS WEIGHT AROUND HALF WAY AROUND THE WORLD. AND IN ANY CASE IT IS RIDICULOUS TO TALK OF "BALANCE" BETWEEN INDIA AND A COUNTRY ONLY ONE-TENTH ITS SIZE UNQUOTE.

11. ELABORATING ON THIS THEME IN A PARTY PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, L.K. ADVANI SAID THAT THE VENTS OF 1971 EVIDENTLY HAD LITTLE EFFECT ON US POLICY, THAT WASHINGTON SUBSCRIBES TO A QUOTE MEDIEVALISTIC BALANCE OF POWER THEORY UNQUOTE IN SOUTH ASIA, AND THAT QUOTE PAKISTAN IS ITS PRINCIPAL AGENT AND ARMS IS ITS MAIN INSTRUMENT FOR THIS PURPOSE UNQUOTE. THE ARMS ISSUE ALSO PROVOKED J.P. NARAYAN, MENTOR OF THE JANATA PARTY, INTO SEEING THE QUESTION AS AN IMPERIALIST THREAT TO THE SUBCONTINENT. IN A MESSAGE TO A SEMINAR ON THE ISSUE IN FEBRUARY 1975, NARAYAN SAID THAT QUOTE THE UNITED STATES IS ATTEMPTING TO MISUSE THE BENEFITS OF DETENTE TO RE-ESTABLISH THE IMPERIALIST HOLD ON RESOURCE-RICH REGIONS UNQUOTE. HE SAW AS QUOTE A TREND TOWARDS A RETURN OF IMPERIALISM IN NEW FORMS UNQUOTE SUCH EVENTS AS THE US QUOTE REARMING OF PAKISTAN UNQUOTE, THE WAR IN VIETNAM, ATTEMPT AT QUOTE INTERVENTIONISM UNQUOTE IN THE BANGLADESH LIBERATION WAR, QUOTE THREATS UNQUOTE BY US LEADERS TO OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, AND THE PROPOSED DIEGO GARCIA BUILD UP. THE CLICHE-RIDDEN TEXT OF J.P.'S STATEMENT AND ITS ALMOST TOTAL ADHERENCE TO STANDARD LEFTIST POSITIONS, HOWEVER, RAISES SOME QUESTION OF THE AUTHORSHIP IF NOT THE ENDORSEMENT OF ALL ITS IDEA.
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